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LABOR AND THE BANK: INVESTIGATING
THE POLITICS OF THE WORLD BANK’S
EMPLOYING WORKERS INDEX
SUSAN L. KANG*
John Jay College of Criminal Justice, New York
ABSTRACT
For many years, trade unions have pressured international financial organi-
zations such as the World Bank to better incorporate protections for workers.
A recent development in this contestation was the World Bank’s 2009
announcement regarding its controversial “Employing Workers Index” in its
widely circulated Doing Business report. Trade unions had argued that the
index, which promoted flexible labor market policies, did not respect the
international norm of worker protections, and urged the World Bank to
change the index. As a result, the Doing Business Group pledged to reform
the Employing Workers Index and to create a new index on protecting
workers. While the 2009 announcement represents a victory for the trade
union movement, and, on the surface, seems to suggest a new respect for
workers’ rights at the World Bank, the effects of this reform remain unclear.
Based on both the history of interactions between trade unions and the World
Bank and the limited changes to the Doing Business 2010 report, this article
expresses skepticism about whether the 2009 reform represents a significant
shift in the World Bank’s neoliberal approach to labor. While the World Bank
remains rhetorically committed both to promoting protections for workers
and to collaborating with trade unions, its policies continue to promote labor
flexibility. I argue that the World Bank’s abandonment of the index was
a strategic choice prompted by pressure from unions in conjunction with a
hostile political environment brought about by the recent financial crisis.
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INTRODUCTION
In April 2009, the World Bank announced a reform that suggested a change in
its attitude toward labor rights. For several years, trade unions had campaigned
against Doing Business, a controversial country index that included a section that
rank-ordered countries on employment regulation. This index, the Employing
Workers Index (EWI), gave higher scores to countries that provided fewer legal
protections for workers. The World Bank released a note in April 2009 saying
that the Doing Business Group would revise the EWI to better handle the social,
political, and economic challenges of the financial crisis. This short note included
pledges to do the following: circulate a memo to staff that the EWI no longer
represented World Bank policy; adjust the index’s methodology to further comply
with the conventions of the International Labor Organization (ILO); hold future
consultation with the ILO and civil society members; and create a new Doing
Business indicator on worker protection (World Bank, 2009). Labor organizations
and their allies welcomed this news (International Trade Union Confederation
[ITUC], 2009b).
Created in 2003, Doing Business has become the World Bank’s most widely
circulated data index, its “flagship” publication (World Bank and International
Finance Corporation, 2009). Doing Business ranks over 180 countries based
on their relative “ease of doing business.” This quantitative figure is based on a
number of factors, such as the ease of starting a new business, taxes, contract
enforcement, and permit regulations. A publication of the private investment wing
of the World Bank, the International Finance Corporation (IFC), it is part of
a larger initiative by the Bank to create best practices for countries seeking to
create optimal “business climates.” Unlike the IFC’s development loans program,
Doing Business does not place obligations on states based on its findings.
However, the World Bankcreated the Doing Business Index with the purpose
of influencing and motivating the design of effective national level reforms
(World Bank and International Finance Corporation, 2008). This document
is therefore an important component of the World Bank’s aspiration to be a
“knowledge bank” (Plehwe, 2007).
The role that the World Bank plays in defining and constructing knowledge
surrounding labor practices is important for material and ideational reasons.
Because of its ability to attach conditions to loans, some of the Bank’s influence is
directly tied to the material benefits of its lending programs. The Bank also has
power over developing states’ reputations and international “creditworthiness”
(Weaver 2007: 502). The World Bank’s epistemic power is based on its ability to
define and widely distribute its construction of social issues. The World Bank’s
knowledge creation shapes and influences policy and domestic debates (Das,
2009). In addition, economists, state leaders, journalists, and academics in the
North and South use their information in making policy and investment decisions
(Goldman, 2005).
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The first report, Doing Business 2004, both created a general Ease of Doing
Business Index and ranked countries in five different categories, including the
legal regulations over terms of employment, that is, the EWI (World Bank and
International Finance Corporation, 2004). Doing Business quickly became the
most widely circulated of all the World Bank’s many publications, gaining
prominence over the World Bank’s annual Development Report. According to the
World Bank, the Doing Business annual reports are one of the Bank’s “flagship
knowledge products” (World Bank Independent Evaluation Group, 2008: xv); the
Doing Business report has received attention from international media outlets
and policymakers (Davis, 2008). It is widely referenced and lauded by a number
of media outlets, academics, and state leaders (World Bank and International
Finance Corporation, 2008). Its initial publication was hailed as a “splendid”
contribution, necessary to create the best policy prescriptions, independent of
“ideology” (Economist, 2004). Doing Business, as the World Bank’s most widely
circulated publication, is a part of its soft power and influence.
The EWI was intended to help states promote private sector investment, to
help create new jobs and increase incomes. By creating an index that rank-
ordered countries’ “investment climates,” the World Bank sought to influence
and motivate the design of effective national- level reforms (World Bank and
International Finance Corporation 2008: 3). Simeon Djankov, the author of the
2005 report, stated that 21 different reforms resulted from the first two years
of the report’s publication. Djankov suggested that ranking countries created
incentives for change, comparing the competition of deregulation to sports,
because “If you keep score, no one wants to lose” (Economist, 2005).
This article focuses on the contestation over Doing Business’s employment
index, the EWI. The EWI gave lower rankings to countries that provided stronger
legal protections, a move that resulted in repeated criticisms from the ITUC,
the AFL-CIO, the ILO, and representatives from both the U.S. and German
governments. The Employing Workers Index (EWI) was based on three factors:
difficulty in hiring and firing workers; costs of hiring and firing workers; and
rigidity of hours (World Bank and International Finance Corporation, 2009).
Prior to the reform in 2009, each of the following policies were considered
a hindrance to business: regulating working hours (maximum of 66 a week);
setting a minimum wage above 25% of the average value added per worker;
protecting against dismissal; or limiting the use of fixed contracts (temporary
work) (Bakvis, 2009).
Though the EWI is only one of many indicators included in the Doing Business
report, the ITUC documented in 2007 that the World Bank had used the EWI
to promote reforms in 23 cases (Kryvoi, 2009; Lee, 2007). The World Bank
included the EWI scores and policy prescriptions in a number of its assessments
and programs, including the Country Economic Memoranda, Country Assistance
Strategies, and Country Partnership Strategies. The World Bank included EWI
scores in its Policy and Institutional Assessment, which it uses in allocating aid,
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credit, debt ceiling, and conditionality (International Trade Union Confederation/
Global Unions, 2007). Members of the Doing Business working group have
defended the EWI. Michael Klein, the chief economist at the International
Finance Corporation, stated that “flexible labor markets tend to be good for people
who don’t have jobs. More rigid markets are more favorable to people who
already have jobs. In emerging markets, labor-market rigidity is very high”
(Davis, 2008: A6).
The World Bank’s statement recognizing the problems with the EWI represents
an important victory for organized labor, but it is unclear to what extent this
reflects a new approach to labor protection and regulation. The World Bank has
dealt with and responded to criticisms about its labor-related practices from
organized labor, the ILO, and civil society for several decades (O’Brien et al.,
2000). Yet the tension between core protections for workers and the World Bank’s
emphasis on neoliberal labor flexibility remains unresolved. By neoliberal, I
mean the dominant political economic ideology that promotes a free market, free
trade, free capital movement, and minimal state regulation, as well as market-
driven social policies, as the optimal policy solution for states and for global
governance (Brenner & Theodore, 2002; Harvey, 2005). This article investigates
whether or not the revision of the EWI reflects a new respect for labor rights at
the World Bank and possibly within the larger economic regulatory regime.
While recognizing the importance of the trade union movement, I argue that the
changes to the EWI do not provide evidence that the World Bank has internalized
the norm of worker protection. Rather, the World Bank’s new rhetoric is best
understood as a cosmetic change brought about by the possible crisis of legitimacy
stemming from the global financial crisis.
LABOR AND THE BANK: BACKGROUND
While the World Bank does not have a specifically labor-related mandate, the
“social question” has been important for the World Bank and other multilateral
economic institutions. Beginning in the 1980s, with the introduction of structural
adjustment policies, multilateral financial institutions began encouraging labor-
related austerity measures, such as cutting public employing during economic
crises. In the 1990s, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank
began to attach strong conditions to loans that promoted labor flexibility as
necessary for such optimal economic outcomes as macroeconomic stability and
GDP growth (Anner & Caraway, 2010). As a result, international trade unions, the
ILO, and other civil society actors also began to push for greater recognition and
inclusion of international labor standards in international economic contexts
during the 1990s.
The Doing Business project, in contrast, attempts to create a universal set
of “best practices” for all countries seeking to promote economic welfare, not
just to help countries in crisis with economic readjustments. States should employ
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these practices because they constitute good economic governance practices.
In other words, the World Bank is creating new norms for states in the global
economy. Despite criticism from prominent economists at the end of the East
Asian financial crisis that the Washington Consensus’s “one size fits all” model
was counterproductive (Stiglitz, 2003; Wade & Veneroso, 1998), this rank-
ordering and categorization of 181 national economies reinforces the concept
that certain economic practices and rules apply universally.
Since the 1990s, trade unions have protested the way in which the World
Bank and other key international economic institutions have reduced labor to
just another cost in the production process, with varying results. Trade unions
have urged the World Bank to include core labor standards in their programs.
In 2000, a press release by the World Bank made only tepid commitments to
engage in further conversations about the importance of core labor standards
and development, stating only that they may be compatible. The press release
expressed support for labor standards regulating child labor and forced labor,
as well as for gender equality in the labor market, but it did not support trade
union rights (World Bank, 2000). When international trade union leaders met
with leaders from the IMF and World Bank in October 2001, James Wolfensohn,
the president of the Bank until 2005, stated that the IMF and the World Bank
supported the ILO conventions that provided protections against child labor,
forced labor, and discrimination. However, the institutions did not support the
rights to workers’ associations and collective bargaining. Wolfensohn and other
leaders claimed that all borrowing countries have their own national employment
systems, some of which do not allow unions, and that the Fund and the Bank
were not in a position to intervene in the business of sovereign states. The Bank
and Fund leaders claimed that trade unions could hurt workers in developing
countries because they created inflexible conditions (Edwards, 2001).
However, the ILO and trade unions, especially the International Confedera-
tion of Free Trade Unions, the predecessor to the ITUC, continued to press these
international economic institutions. Since the 1990s, with criticism surrounding
the East Asian financial crisis, the World Bank and IMF have instituted reforms
that emphasize civil society engagement and transparency. As a result, the
World Bank, IMF, and trade unions agreed to regular joint meetings to discuss
labor-related issues, which they began holding in 2001. In 2003, the World Bank
announced that based on its research, it could now endorse core labor standards
as part of the development project (World Bank, 2003). The World Bank created
its “Core Labor Standards Toolkit,” which directed staff to include core labor
standards in the Country Assistance Strategy (CAS) reports (Committee on
Monitoring International Labor Standards, 2004). A Country Assistance Strategy
is a document, created by Bank staff for active borrowing countries, that both
outlines hindrances to development and identifies ways in which the Bank can
provide the best assistance in poverty reduction. The Core Labor Standards
Toolkit provides Bank staff with information on core labor standards, which are to
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be included within a country’s CAS (World Bank, 2010). However, while the
inclusion of labor protections was a positive development, the Core Labor
Standards Toolkit did not create conditions for loans, but rather provided guide-
lines for finding information about a borrowing country’s core labor standards.
This fell short of the trade unions’ goal of incorporating of core labor standards
into World Bank conditionality.
During the consultation process, the World Bank did agree to a significant
institutional reform that incorporated labor standards. In February 2006, the IFC
added the four core labor standards to the PS2, which are the conditions required
from borrowing companies. This new set of conditions, which the World Bank
created in consultations with trade unions and the ILO, placed obligations on
companies, not states (International Confederation of Free Trade Unions, 2006).
In April 2006, the World Bank’s public sector lending division included core
labor standards conditions in the “Standard Bidding Document for Procurement
of Works.” In addition, Equator Banks, the commercial lending banks that follow
the World Bank’s environmental standards, called “Equator Principles,” also
adopted core labor standards as a requirement for private companies that take out
loans. Equator Banks currently fund about 80% of international private financing
in the development world (International Finance Corporation, 2006; Polaski,
2007). In light of the other changes, the World Bank’s suspension of the EWI
seems like another step in the slow, but progressing, adoption of better labor
standards as an important business practice. One could conclude that the World
Bank had incorporated the norm of core labor standards and perhaps this chal-
lenged the hegemony of the neoliberal labor market’s practice. However, the
evidence so far suggests that even these institutional reforms do not yet demon-
strate a challenge to neoliberal approaches to labor at the World Bank.
CONTENTION SURROUNDING “DOING BUSINESS”
This section will consider the history of protests by trade unions, the ILO, and
other actors against EWI, and the responses of the World Bank, in order to
evaluate the World Bank’s relationship to the labor protection norm. As soon as
the first Doing Business report was initially released in 2003, the employment
indicator was recognized as problematic because it regarded labor as just another
part of the production input and therefore recommended reducing labor costs
(Høyland, Moene, & Willumson, 2008). Because of the potential influence of
the EWI, trade unions and the ILO critiqued Doing Business. Between 2004 and
2008, the ITUC sent 10 statements of concern to the World Bank about the EWI
(Bakvis, 2009). In addition, trade union groups such as the ITUC and Global
Unions used occasional joint meetings with the IMF and the Bank as opportunities
to protest Doing Business. During these meetings, the unions pressured the
international financial institutions (IFIs) to incorporate core labor standards into
these institutions’ structural adjustment conditions. The proceedings of these joint
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meetings show that the World Bank expressed support for incorporating labor
protections and trade union consultation, but this did not translate into strong
protections for core labor standards. Rather, progress was slow, and often
institutional reforms lacked sufficient teeth. There is little evidence from these
meetings that the World Bank had internalized the labor protection norm.
Between 2004 and 2009, trade unions criticized the EWI and the World Bank’s
general failure to address labor rights in a number of ways. Trade unions often
pushed the World Bank to absorb core labor standards into its country loan
conditionality. The World Bank includes strong macroeconomic policy conditions
on its loans to borrowing countries. The ILO and the ITUC also sought greater
consultation and inclusion of trade union representatives in both country-level
and central policymaking. Trade union representatives also expressed frustration
at the gap between the Bank’s rhetoric of commitment to core labor standards
and its actual practices. In fact, the trade union representatives argued that the
Bank’s claim to endorse core labor standards and the EWI’s neoliberal approach
to labor regulation were contradictory (International Monetary Fund and World
Bank, 2004, 2006, 2007, 2009).
While the responses by World Bank representatives, and occasionally the
President and Executive Directors, were generally positive, staffers gave many
justifications explaining why greater protection of core labor rights was not
possible. For example, World Bank representatives often responded to requests
for core labor rights conditionality by claiming that the World Bank was
relying less on conditionality and more on “country specific” policies. During the
2004 joint meeting, President Wolfensohn suggested that the trade unions’focus
on structural adjustment should not be a concern, because the “Washington
Consensus is dead” (International Monetary Fund and World Bank, 2004). When
trade unions pressed the World Bank on this issue again during the 2006 joint
meetings, representatives explained that the World Bank could not make core
labor standards part of its loan conditionality, but the IFC could “condition”
its private sector loans because it worked with private companies. However,
the World Bank argued that the conditions on its major loans were based on
consultations with countries, and therefore it could not intervene in countries’
policies or impose policies on them (International Monetary Fund and World
Bank, 2006). This was similar to the responses of the World Bank in 2000,
when the World Bank representatives had told union members that trade
union rights such as freedom of association and the right to collective bar-
gaining fell outside the purview of the Bank, because they were too “political”
(International Confederation of Free Trade Unions/World Bank/International
Monetary Fund, 2000).
The World Bank’s rhetoric of promoting trade union collaboration did not
translate into collaboration with local World Bank officials and trade unions at
the country level. During the 2007 meeting, the World Bank and trade unions
discussed the results of a survey on trade union and World Bank staff interactions.
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This survey found dissatisfaction among both groups. Trade unionists complained
that many of the Country Assistance Strategies did not include core labor stan-
dards. In response, Bank staff members claimed that trade unionists often did
not have “productive” meetings and that “unions should learn to manage their
expectations.” Another staffer stated that unions were “not prepared to discuss
some economic issues” and lacked “technical capacity,” suggesting that trade
unions’ focus on equity and justice made them ill-equipped to consult with
Bank staffers (International Monetary Fund and World Bank, 2007).
During the joint meetings, the World Bank representatives frequently expressed
their appreciation of the Bank’s trade union consultations and collaborations
and the high value the Bank placed on them, yet the Bank refused to take
responsibility for the shortcomings in labor protection of its borrowing coun-
tries (International Monetary Fund and World Bank, 2007). Yet, when the
trade union representatives expressed concern that union consultations within
World Bank headquarters were not leading to changes at the country level, the
World Bank representatives responded that this should be brought up to the
country governments, not the World Bank. When trade union representatives
from Croatia, Nepal, Colombia, Kenya, and the Dominican Republic cited the
ways in which labor market flexibility reforms hurt workers, the World Bank
suggested that workers and trade unions communicate instead with the relevant
governments. World Bank representatives refused to acknowledge a link between
country practices and the EWI, despite the Bank’s claim to engage in knowledge
production (International Monetary Fund and World Bank, 2006).
World Bank officials also frustrated the attempts of trade unions and their
allies to promote greater cooperation and promote labor standards when Bank
officials questioned their capacities. The ILO participated in these joint
meetings and expressed a desire for greater collaboration with the Bank. How-
ever, one World Bank representative stated that the ILO was not adequately
“equipped” to deal with policy issues. Another representative, from the World
Bank’s Social Protection Unit, stated that the ILO would have to increase its
“research capacities” if it wanted to work as a “credible participant” in labor
market research. The World Bank representative meant that the ILO staff
lacked sufficient expertise in economic research. At this meeting, the World
Bank representatives failed to acknowledge arguments that did not fit within
the Bank’s highly economistic framework. Other scholars working in the
critical tradition have similarly documented the fact that the World Bank includes
a wide variety of actors in its knowledge creation networks as a means to
demonstrate its dedication to new norms, but that it acknowledges only
those outside contributions that do not challenge its dominant, neoliberal econ-
omistic approach (Stone, 2003). Despite the ILO’s position as the leading
international organization in protecting workers, World Bank representatives
did not see it as institutionally capable (International Monetary Fund and World
Bank, 2006).
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Yet the joint meetings did show that there was disagreement among highly
placed World Bank staff about the EWI and Doing Business. During the 2004
meeting, the vice president of Private Sector Development defended the EWI
because Doing Business was primarily concerned about wage creation (Inter-
national Monetary Fund and World Bank, 2004). Yet in the 2006 joint meeting,
a Bank representative noted that the EWI had caused “lively debate” among
staff members and admitted that there was some bias in the EWI (International
Monetary Fund and World Bank, 2006). When the World Bank Executive
Directors met with trade union representatives during that same meeting, many
of the executive directors commented on the EWI. “Some” argued that Doing
Business should be totally scrapped, while “many” criticized the EWI. A few
Executive Directors defended Doing Business and called it a useful tool. One
claimed that some countries were using the EWI “incorrectly.” However,
President Wolfowitz (president in 2006–2007) was firm in his statement that
overregulation, which the EWI sought to counsel against, hurts job growth
and small business development (International Monetary Fund and World
Bank, 2006). The diversity of opinions expressed by Executive Directors demon-
strates the possibility for the socialization and internalization of the labor pro-
tection norm.
There is further evidence that trade union mobilization for the inclusion of
core labor standards has had an influence on the Doing Business report. In the
2009 report, released in 2008, the Doing Business Group claimed that it had
reformed the methodology of the EWI so that a state could respect all of the
core labor standards and still receive a favorable EWI score. Notably, this was
contested by an ILO Executive Director (Bakvis, 2009). At the January 2009 joint
meeting, prior to the April 2009 announcement of the change in the EWI, the
parties focused on the financial crisis and social protection. In response to World
Bank Senior Vice President Justin Lin’s call for protection for the poor, trade
unions called for the complete abandonment of the policy of pushing the “total
flexibility” of the labor market, since this policy had led to more informal and
precarious labor. In response to questions about Doing Business, World Bank
President Zoelleck acknowledged these concerns, stating that the World Bank
needed to include information about each country’s application of core labor
standards, and he recommended changes to the EWI, to prevent states from
dropping below certain minimum worker protections. For example, he suggested
a floor on conditions such as the length of a workweek (International Monetary
Fund and World Bank, 2009).
In addition to the dissent among the Executive Directors, the World Bank’s
own independent monitoring group also criticized the EWI in its 2008 report
evaluating Doing Business. The report stressed the lack of consensus in the
discipline of economics as to whether policy and regulations were the most
important factors for promoting private section development (World Bank and
International Finance Corporation, 2008). According to the report, many World
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Bank staffers also questioned whether regulations and national laws were the
most important factors in determining investment. Rather, the report stated, most
World Bank experts identified political stability, access to infrastructure, access
to credit, and human capital as the most important factors in promoting private
sector investment. The report also pointed out the many methodological and
political problems of the EWI indicator (World Bank Independent Evaluation
Group, 2008). While this evaluation supported trade union, ILO, and civil society
criticism of the World Bank, it did not result in immediate changes, as the
monitoring group did not have direct access to Bank management. In fact, the
“Management Response,” the Bank leadership’s reply to the independent evalu-
ation group’s report, did not refer to the recommendations on changing the EWI
index (World Bank Independent Evaluation Group, 2008).
In addition to participating in some of the joint meetings, the International
Labor Organization criticized the EWI in its research and proceedings. For
example, the ILO Governing Body criticized the EWI during its 2007 meeting
(International Labour Office, 2007). The ILO’s research team published a number
of analyses of the EWI, which included criticism of its antiworker bias. Berg
and Cazes’ (2007) study criticized the methodologies used to determine the EWI
index, claiming that they suffered from selection bias, unrealistic assumptions,
reliance on subject indicators, and omitted variables. The study argued that
states who took the ranking seriously could fall into a deregulative race to the
bottom. Qualitative studies of Argentina and Bulgaria, which had both increased
their labor flexibility, illustrated these negative effects. Lee, McCann, and Torm
(2008) reached similar conclusions. Their review of the economic literature
highlighted the lack of empirical evidence showing that flexible labor markets
lead to an increase in employment and economic growth. They also argued
that the EWI ignored social and political institutions by focusing primarily on
legal regulations, failing to recognize that labor regulation can have beneficial
effects, both economically and socially (Lee, McCann, & Torm, 2008).
Members of the U.S. Congress also expressed concerns about the EWI. Six
U.S. senators criticized the EWI for rewarding countries that violate basic labor
rights and encouraging the deregulation of workers’ protections (Engler, 2006).
In addition, the chair of the U.S. House Financial Services Committee, Barney
Frank (D-Mass), held a hearing in October 2007, during which he denounced the
World Bank’s Doing Business index, with special attention to the EWI. Frank
argued that Doing Business failed to properly recognize core labor standards,
stating that “essentially what we get from the Doing Business report is that
the nicer you are to your workers, the worse you are as a place to do business.”
Frank called this an “extraordinarily . . . simplistic and regressive approach.” The
hearing included testimonies from business representatives who defended
Doing Business as an important service to both countries and investors, and
testimonies from the AFL-CIO leaders, an international trade scholar, and a
representative of the ITUC (Committee on Financial Services, 2007). The ITUC
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and the AFL-CIO continued to criticize the World Bank and Doing Business
as subsequent reports were published, although both organizations lauded the
2009 decision to suspend the EWI.
Congressman Frank also sponsored an amendment to the House’s authorization
of funding for the World Bank’s International Development Agency (IDA) in
2008. This amendment, H.R. 6306, sought to restrict the World Bank from using
the EWI to undermine workers’ rights (AFL-CIO, 2009). This amendment became
part of a larger bill authorizing $3.7 billion for the World Bank, and calling for
a reform of the “paying taxes” index of Doing Business. Frank had also held
meetings with IMF Managing Director Dominique Strauss-Kahn and World
Bank President Zoellick about Doing Business. Strauss-Kahn reportedly directed
the IMF staff not to use the EWI as a basis for policy, based on methodological
problems (Financial Services Committee, 2009).
While World Bank representatives often defended the EWI, the Doing Business
Group did respond to its critics before the April 2009 announcement. This
suggests that even though the Doing Business Group strongly supported the
labor flexibility orthodoxy, it was not immune from civil society or other external
pressures. The announcement of the change to the indicator came in a press
release stating that development goals needed to be balanced with larger social
goals, especially during a time of economic crisis. While not specifying clear
commitments, the April 2009 press release stated that
In addition, we will convene a working group including representatives
from the ILO, as the international standard setting body, trade unions, busi-
nesses, academics and legal experts. This group can serve as an important
source of advice on revising the EWI and on the establishment of a new
worker protection indicator, as well as offering broader ideas on labor market
and employment protection issues—with a view to creating regulations that
help build robust jobs with adequate protection in the formal sector that
can withstand future crises. (World Bank and International Finance Cor-
poration , 2009)
This statement suggests that the Doing Business Group felt pressure to incor-
porate trade union, civil society, and ILO voices into its index to better reflect
the Bank’s commitment to core labor standards.
The results of the IFC’s incorporation of core labor standards into its lending
programs do not support the idea that internalization of the labor protection norms
has occurred at the World Bank. One would expect to see a well-enforced and
relatively quickly implemented regime promoting core labor standards within
the IFC’s lending practices, as evidence of a changing approach to labor standards.
Wolfensohn first promised during the 2004 joint meetings with trade unions
that the World Bank would soon include core labor standards in its standard
bidding documents for private companies that wished to do business with the
Bank (International Monetary Fund and World Bank, 2004). Yet at the 2006
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meeting, Bank staffers did not provide any progress or news on this pledge.
Only in 2009 did Bank officials announce progress, when a procurement officer
told trade unionists that the four core labor standards had been incorporated in all
of the World Bank’s civil works projects. The Bank recognized that there was a
problem with compliance, and it was considering creating a complaint mechanism.
President Zoelleck reiterated the Bank’s support for including core labor stan-
dards in the Bank’s procurement standards. However, the trade unionists stated
during the 2009 joint meetings that the IFC guidelines lacked effective com-
pliance procedures or timelines. The third party auditors enforcing the guidelines
often lacked experience in trade union rights (International Monetary Fund and
World Bank, 2009).
EVALUATING THE 2009 “REFORM”
In the April 2009 note titled “Revisions to the EWI Indicator,” the World Bank
communicated that the business climate is only one of many important elements
of developmental policies, and other inputs should also be given “appropriate
weight.” The note lists “political stability, social safety nets to shield vulnerable
parts of society from intolerable levels of risk and protection of rights for workers
and households as well as for firms.” Governments should also focus on the
needs of workers and poor households, not just the needs of businesses. The
statement commits the Word Bank to “scaling up our work on social safety
nets,” during the period of economic crisis (World Bank, 2009). The rhetoric
within the “Revisions to the EWI Indicator” note suggests that the World Bank
now wants to value the interests of workers and vulnerable populations as much
as it values firms.
According to a “social learning” argument, the World Bank, or at least the
Doing Business Group, has been persuaded by trade unions and other critics to
promote the norm of labor protection over the neoliberal commodification of
labor. This promise of reform can be seen as a moment of socialization and
learning. Prior to 2009, Bank officials rhetorically supported and made some
concessions toward core labor standards, such as the inclusion of these within
IFC standards. However, during its joint meetings with the IMF and trade unions,
World Bank representatives expressed reluctance to engage in substantive insti-
tutional reforms, such as labor protection conditionality. The critical approach
would point to a general crisis of legitimacy that the World Bank suffered given
its promotion of labor flexibility in light of the financial crisis. According to
an in-depth study of the World Bank since the 1990s, the Bank has suffered
from intense criticism from a number of external actors, but because of its
politically motivated, yet disparate, leadership, the Bank has lacked a clear vision
of its new direction (Weaver, 2007).
It is not clear how the April 2009 revision of the EWI affects the position of
labor standards at the World Bank. It is notable that the Doing Business 2010
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report contains little evidence of norm socialization at the World Bank. Only a few
changes have been incorporated in the 2010 Doing Business report. The new EWI
measure changed the methodology of calculating the index, including more
generous allowances for legal minimums for night and holiday pay. The revised
index does not penalize countries that provide minimum wages above $1.25/day
(adjusted for purchasing power parity) and allows for a minimum threshold for
severance pay (World Bank and International Finance Corporation, 2009). The
2010 report also includes the beginnings of a Protecting Workers index. The
Bank’s 2009 note included a pledge to create a new Protecting Workers indicator.
This was supposed to present information on whether a country’s laws were in
compliance with the core labor standards. However, the 2010 report focused
solely on the child labor protections, evaluating 102 countries on the basis of
whether their employment laws set a minimum age of 14 or 15 years for general
employment, 18 years for hazardous work, and 12 or 13 years for light employ-
ment (World Bank, 2009). The 2010 report stated that more labor conventions
would be incorporated into the Protecting Workers Index with the guidance of
the ILO, but it is notable that trade union rights, the more controversial core
labor conventions that the Bank had rejected as recently as 2001, were not
included in this early study.
In the written introduction to the Employing Workers Index, the 2010 Doing
Business report stated that regulations were necessary to protect workers from
“from arbitrary or unfair treatment and to ensure efficient contracting between
employers and workers.” It referenced “flexicurity,” a principle that promotes
both labor market flexibility and social safety nets, endorsed by the ILO and the
Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), as important
during the financial crisis. The report reiterated that a state should follow the
highest levels of labor flexibility measures promoted by Doing Business, while
still complying with the core labor conventions of the ILO. Unlike earlier reports,
this introduction did make some arguments for “adequate safety nets” to deal
with unemployment and poverty. While the report was sensitive to the fact that
“reform is challenging,” the general narrative, claiming that more labor regulation
led to more unemployment and informal labor markets, remained the same.
Ultimately, the message of the report was quite mixed. The report stated both that
unemployment insurance could be a good policy and also that it could prolong
unemployment. The final part of the Employing Workers’ Index report praised
“unemployment insurance savings accounts,” which create private funds for
workers, as a policy choice that did not risk distorting the incentives for unem-
ployed workers (World Bank and International Finance Corporation, 2009).
The methodological changes promised in April 2009 did not lead to a sub-
stantive shift in the outcome of the EWI, nor do they represent a shift toward a
commitment to social safety nets and employment concerns. This change to the
EWI resulted in only a few changes being incorporated in the 2010 version of
the Doing Business report. The new EWI measure changed the methodology
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of calculating the index, including a slightly more generous allowance for
legal minimums for night and holiday pay. The revised index does not penalize
countries that provide minimum wages above $1.25/day (adjusted for purchasing
power parity), and allows for a minimumthreshold for severance pay (World
Bank and International Finance Corporation, 2009).
Countries with legal frameworks that protected workers from suffering at the
whim of employers were still given lower scores in the EWI. For example, EWI
2010 gave higher rankings to countries that had fewer restrictions on fixed term
contracts (which allow for temporary work), with lower minimum wages (as
long as the daily wage was above the World Bank–determined poverty line),
and with fewer restrictions and regulations on night, weekend, holiday, and
overtime work. The “reformed” EWI still gave higher rankings to countries
that created few obligations for employers in terms of layoff and termination
notification and preferential (priority) treatment of laid off workers, including
fewer costs for employers related to redundancy. Even a policy requirement of
notification three months prior to layoffs was considered a detriment to doing
business (World Bank & International Finance Corporation, 2009). In fact, even
though the April 2009 statement noted that social security and workers’ pro-
tections were important during an economic crisis, the Doing Business report
criticized countries like Honduras for implementing such reforms to deal with
the financial crisis (International Trade Union Confederation, 2009a).
This lack of substantive change did not go unnoticed by trade unions. The
ITUC, which had praised the April 2009 announcement on the change in the
EWI, released a statement expressing its disappointment with the 2010 Doing
Business report. Notably, the 2010 report did not include any statements explain-
ing the April announcement: it gave no reasons why the EWI had constituted
World Bank policy or why it was no longer the appropriate basis for loan
conditionality. In addition, the EWI indicator still penalized countries that had
legal protections for workers: Cambodia, for instance, received a lower ranking
because of its new social security deductions. Doing Business 2010 also penalized
low or no cost measures that contribute to workers’ interests, such as Portugal’s
requirement that employers give employees two weeks advance notice before
laying them off. ITUC General Secretary Guy Ryder criticized Doing Business
for failing to publicize the fact that the EWI was no longer World Bank policy,
failing to adequately address the increased insecurity of workers during the current
economic crisis, and failing to provide strong protections for employees’ interests
(International Trade Union Confederation, 2009a).
The Doing Business report remains an important knowledge product of the
World Bank. Yet while trade unions were able to influence the Doing Business
Group, the evidence provided thus far by the 2010 Doing Business report demon-
strates that rather than a strong commitment to workers’ rights, neoliberal and
market ideologies remain hegemonic . But despite this early evidence, greater
influence and deeper incorporation of the labor protection norm in the World
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Bank is still possible. The global financial crisis was an important opportunity
for the adoption of new social norms, and whether the effects of the crisis will
challenge future economic ideologies has not yet been established. The fact that
Doing Business is creating the Protecting Workers Index, in conjunction with
the ILO and civil society actors, seems promising, and suggests a possible sea
change. States may feel competitive pressure to ratchet up their protections for
workers, creating a possible “race to the top.” In addition, some of the most
draconian aspects of the original EWI have been reformed. While states are still
encouraged to have lower minimum wages, the reformed indicator allows for
minimum wages set above poverty levels. The EWI is also more generous in its
definition of appropriate work hours regulations.
However, there are a number of reasons to remain suspicious of these changes.
In addition to the continuation of the flexibility measurements, the World Bank’s
track record in its collaboration with civil society and reforming influences has
been mixed at best, and this collaboration has been unsuccessful according
to some critics. For example, critical scholars who have studied the influence of
the environmental activist networks in the World Bank have noted that even
significant reforms have not changed outcomes. The World Bank now works
with many NGOs in creating “green knowledge” prior to beginning new projects.
But even though information production in the World Bank has become more
diffuse and decentralized, much of the information that goes against the dominant
discourse is ignored (Goldman, 2005). Rather than substantively changing its
practices, the World Bank has used such critiques to “reinvent itself, tame its
critics, and intervene in an ever-growing number of institutions, terrains, and
social bodies” (Goldman, 2005: 5). Attempts by activists and NGOs to push
the norm of environmental sustainability into the World Bank’s mission has
resulted in an evolution of the neoliberal agenda rather than a challenge to it,
and this has provided further opportunities for intervention and privatization
(Goldman, 2005).
Furthermore, it is difficult to gauge how changes to Doing Business will
influence the rest of the policymaking decisions, recommendations, and condi-
tionalities created by the World Bank. As mentioned earlier, the EWI is one
attempt by one World Bank research group to create a scientific and objective set
of neoliberal policies for states. In other words, Doing Business represents an
already dominant discourse within development and economic contexts. While
Doing Business was unique because of its benchmarking, its policy recom-
mendations were not new. Rather, the quantitative figures were useful in pro-
viding an authoritative, technical veneer to the preferred policies of the experts at
the World Bank, the IMF, and the OECD. Citizens, workers, civil society organi-
zations, and international organizations such as the ILO opposed these policies.
In addition, the labor flexibility policies that discourage regulation and pro-
tection for workers precede Doing Business. Many developing countries engaged
in labor market flexibility reforms starting in the 1990s, as part of larger reform
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packages or because of competitive economic pressures (Cook, 2007). According
to a trade unionstudy of IMF and World Bank documents in 27 countries, labor
flexibility was a key condition for many lending programs. For example, labor
flexibility reforms were a “structural benchmark,” meaning a key condition, of a
loan to Nicaragua (Lloyd & Weissman, 2001). While South Korea, for instance,
introduced significant labor flexibility reforms in connection with IMF loans,
it was not necessarily coerced into doing so. Rather, powerful business interests
had already sought such reforms, although the parliament had found them polit-
ically difficult to implement prior to the IMF bailout in 1997 (Koo, 2001). The
South Korean case suggests that countries may feel competitive pressure to
engage in labor flexibility reforms, independent of the kinds of knowledge that the
World Bank creates. In other words, market pressures may be the key motivation
behind states’ adoption of labor flexibility policies, while World Bank support
may legitimize existing interests.
CONCLUSION
This article is an early exploration of the ways in which labor flexibility rules
and policies clash with the long-standing labor protections and rights regime.
The World Bank’s claim that a country can both minimize the costs of labor and
fully protect the key labor conventions seems counterintuitive. Doing Business
2010’s attempts to both promote flexibility and respond to the strong critiques of
their EWI demonstrates this difficulty. Policies promoting labor market flexibility
challenge the underlying foundations of the international norm of labor protection,
the understanding that labor is more than a simple factor of production. The
“reformed” EWI seeks to reinscribe the commodification of labor as a “good
practice,” while paying lip service to worker protections and social safety nets.
I argue, therefore, that there remains little evidence that the EWI reform consti-
tutes socialization or incorporation of the norm of core labor standards within
the World Bank. While the development of the Protecting Workers Index is
promising, it is unclear whether this will create an incentive for states to protect
core labor standards.
While the critical perspective is pessimistic about the future of worker pro-
tections at the Bank, it is still possible that a larger ideological shift is occurring.
The April 2009 press release, as well as the January 2009 joint meeting with
the World Bank, IMF, and trade unions, stressed the relevance of the financial
crisis. A significant “empirical fact” supporting labor flexibility claims has been
challenged. This fact, which Freeman calls the “IMF-OECD orthodoxy,” is a
dominant paradigm within economics that holds the U.S. “employment miracle,”
as evidence for the efficacy of labor flexibility policies. Compared to peer
economies, the American labor market has historically been the least regulated
and most flexible; it has historically had the fewest job security and safety
protections, the highest degree of mobility, and the lowest degree of union
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membership and coverage by collective agreements. Many believed the United
States had higher employment than similar industrial economies because it
allowed market forces to determine outcomes (Freeman, 2008).
One way to understand the small change in the EWI is to examine how the
financial crisis has challenged the IMF-OECD orthodoxy. As the Bank is involved
in “knowledge creation,” the new, conflicting empirical evidence may be moti-
vating Bank behavior as much as political pressure. Since 2008, unemployment
statistics have created a chink in the labor flexibility story. By April 2009, the
United States’ unemployment rate had equaled that of Western Europe, a result
of the financial crisis that the Center for Economic and Policy Research claimed
“turned the case for the U.S. model almost entirely on its head” (Norris, 2009).
While there are many reasons to question whether the calamities of the current
financial crisis will change the hegemonic economic ideologies, especially given
the lack of substantive political response to the social challenges of the crisis, the
ways in which the crisis has discredited key claims of neoliberalism may prove
to be important. Furthermore, the weakened economic position of the United
States, traditionally the key proponent of neoliberal ideology within the Bank,
may affect the global economic regime. While liberal market ideologies remain
dominant, the continuation of the crisis may lead to a “significantly moderated”
liberalism, as Robert Wade (2009: 559) argues.
In addition, while the Protecting Workers Index is currently in its early stages,
the fact that the Doing Business Group has included key social partners in the
creation of this index is another reason for possible optimism. The members of the
consultative group creating the reformed EWI and the new Protecting Workers
Index include prominent members of the trade union leadership and the ILO,
which is promising (World Bank and International Finance Corporation, 2010).
The index could serve as a useful tool for trade unions and NGOs to pressure
national governments to create stronger protections for rights. Advocates might
use this index in campaigns to focus on the labor practices associated with the
investment practices of multinational corporations and other key institutional
investors. However, the extent to which this index could create competitive
incentives for states to implement policy changes is not clear. Unlike some of the
other Doing Business indicators, such as the index on the ease of starting a
business, it is not clear if states seeking private investment will be motivated to
improve their labor protections to attract private investment.
In fact, it is possible that the opposite may happen, given the increased
economic hardship resulting from the economic crisis. Emerging markets, those
middle-income economies that became hot locations for foreign investment
during the 1990s, may be particularly likely to lower their worker protections
in times of credit problems and decreased international trade. While advanced
industrial economies have clear competitive advantages in a strong infrastruc-
ture and human capital, second-tier economies may be motivated to lower their
labor costs in an effort to compete against less-developed, and thus lower labor
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cost economies. Wade predicts that many emerging markets, including rela-
tively prominent economies such as Argentina, Lithuania, Turkey, South Korea,
and Venezuela, may be on the verge of collapse (Wade, 2009). A decision by
policymakers in such economies to further promote labor flexibility at the cost of
labor protection would affect a significant percentage of the working population.
Any sort of contrary knowledge created and promoted by the World Bank would
have little relevance in such a scenario. Furthermore, the political climate in
the richest economies provides little evidence for optimism. Rather, neoliberal
ideologies seem to be gaining support in the United States and Western Europe.
With the electoral successes of rightwing parties in Europe and the dominance of
the austerity discourse in both the United States and Europe, it is doubtful that
the financial crisis has shifted economic ideologies toward a more protective
stance (New Zealand Herald, 2010).
This article demonstrates the difficulty of understanding labor rights norms
within the context of the neoliberal dominance of international economic institu-
tions. While the core labor standards enjoy strong rhetorical support, there cur-
rently exists limited evidence that the “reform” of the EWI represents a strength-
ening of the worker protection norm. Therefore, it is difficult to gauge whether
the World Bank has strongly adopted this norm, or whether the recent reform
reflects a strategic choice in response to critics. Doing Business’s decision to
suspend the EWI is an important step toward challenging the neoliberal inter-
national employment norm, but it is not yet clear how such a step will affect
the strength and importance of this norm in the World Bank and beyond.
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